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Does luck egalitarianism lose its appeal in the face of genetic engineering? 
 
Areti Theophilopoulou, MSc 
 
areti.theofilopoulou@gmail.com 
Abstract 
 
 
It has been suggested that the era of genetic interventions will sound the death knell for luck 
egalitarianism, as it will blur the line between chance and choice, on which theories of distributive justice 
often rest. By examining the threats posed to these theories, a crucial assumption is exposed; it is assumed 
that a commitment to the neutralisation of the effects of luck implies the endorsement of even the most 
morally controversial enhancements. In antithesis, I argue that an attractive theory of luck egalitarianism, 
Dworkinian liberal equality, enables us to deduce plausible implications for genetic engineering. By 
focusing on the abstract moral commitments at the heart of Dworkin’s theory, a twofold purpose is 
served. First, they reveal in what ways the criticisms misfire, thereby safeguarding luck egalitarianism. 
Second, Dworkinian luck egalitarianism is further strengthened, as it produces plausible guidelines for 
public policy on genetic engineering in liberal societies. 
 
 
 
 
Οι επιπτώσεις της γενετικής μηχανικής για τον εξισωτισμό της τύχης 
 
Αρετή Θεοφιλοπούλου, MSc 
 
Περίληψη 
 
 
Ορισμένοι φιλόσοφοι έχουν υποστηρίξει ότι η επερχόμενη εποχή της γενετικής μηχανικής θα σημάνει 
το τέλος των θεωριών του εξισωτισμού της τύχης, καθώς τα όρια μεταξύ τύχης και επιλογής, πάνω στα 
οποία βασίζονται οι συγκεκριμένες θεωρίες, θα γίνουν δυσδιάκριτα. Η εξέταση των επιχειρημάτων που 
καλούνται να καταρρίψουν οι υποστηρικτές αυτών των θεωριών αποκαλύπτει μία προβληματική 
προκείμενη: οι επικριτές τους υποθέτουν ότι, από τη στιγμή που ο εξισωτισμός της τύχης στοχεύει στην 
εξουδετέρωση της επίδρασης της τύχης στις ζωές μας, δεσμεύεται να δεχτεί ακόμα και τις πιο ηθικά 
αμφιλεγόμενες γενετικές βελτιώσεις. Αντιθέτως, στην παρούσα έκθεση αποδεικνύεται ότι τουλάχιστον 
μία θεωρία εξισωτισμού της τύχης, η θεωρία του Ronald Dworkin, μας επιτρέπει να εξάγουμε χρήσιμα 
συμπεράσματα για τη γενετική μηχανική. Η ανάλυση των αφηρημένων ηθικών δεσμεύσεων στην καρδιά 
της θεωρίας του Dworkin ικανοποιεί δύο στόχους. Αρχικά, αποκαλύπτει τους λόγους για τους οποίους οι 
ενστάσεις αστοχούν, σώζοντας, έτσι, τον εξισωτισμό της τύχης. Παράλληλα, η θεωρία του Dworkin 
ενισχύεται, καθώς αποδεικνύεται ότι δύναται να προσφέρει ωφέλιμες κατευθυντήριες γραμμές σχετικά με 
τη δημόσια πολιτική στην εποχή της γενετικής μηχανικής. 
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Introduction 
 
 As genetic engineering becomes a 
technologically feasible possibility, terrifying 
images from Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World 
are born; images of a world of grave inequalities 
and robot-like people
1
. Yet upon reflection, one 
wonders whether this intuitive reaction is simply 
another manifestation of the fact that humans 
have always been biased in favour of the status 
quo and suspicious of radical change. The 
burden of argumentative clarity thus falls upon 
philosophers, who are expected to disentangle 
argument from bias, reasons for action from the 
fear of the unknown. 
 It is thought that the era of genetic 
engineering, namely of genetic therapy and 
enhancement, will uncover the shaky roots of 
some theories, by exposing their implications for 
genetic interventions; in antithesis, the 
plausibility of other theories will immediately be 
highlighted. In particular, responsibility-sensitive 
theories of justice are expected to face 
challenges, in virtue of their distinction between 
the moral significance of choice as opposed to 
chance. Indeed, numerous theorists have argued 
or implied that luck egalitarianism will fall into 
the first category of theories
i
. This is because, it 
is argued or assumed, the philosophical 
commitments of luck egalitarianism imply 
adherence to the concept of genetic equality, 
which seems morally reprehensible for a variety 
of reasons. An analysis of this argument is 
offered in the first part of this thesis. 
Subsequently, I examine the particular problems 
that the concept of genetic equality seems to 
pose to luck egalitarianism; assuming that the 
latter implies prescription of the former, I expose 
the internal fallacies of these claims, to prove 
that even if the basic argument were valid, it 
would not immediately sound the death knell for 
luck egalitarianism. 
 I contend, however, that luck 
egalitarianism need not imply that genetic 
equality is desirable. In order to prove why this 
is so, and more importantly, what luck 
egalitarianism does require in the face of genetic 
                                                          
i
 Luck egalitarian theories of justice claim that inequalities 
resulting from brute, i.e. unchosen, luck, are unfair. 
engineering, I rely on a particular conception of 
liberal equality, Dworkinian luck 
egalitarianism
ii
. I thus deduce from the central 
commitments of this theory which interventions 
are required, which ones are simply permissible, 
and which ones are strictly impermissible
iii
. 
 It should be stressed that although I rely on 
Dworkin’s ideas, my pursuit is not to interpret 
and spell out the exact implications of Dworkin’s 
luck egalitarianism. Rather, I aspire to 
demonstrate how an attractive conception of luck 
egalitarianism, which is based on Dworkinian 
political morality, avoids certain criticisms, and 
gives rise to a compelling theory of justice in 
genetics. As long as there is commitment to anti-
perfectionist public policy, different luck 
egalitarian theories may also reach similar 
conclusions. The imminence of genetic 
interventions, however, does give us reason to 
reject theories, luck egalitarian or not, that 
cannot offer satisfying responses to the worries 
analysed in Part I. 
 A central assumption that underlies my 
pursuit should be clear: I generally assume an 
ideal level of risk, effectiveness, and availability 
to individuals from different social classes 
throughout the paper, in order to focus on the 
philosophical implications of luck egalitarianism 
for genetic engineering. It should be stressed 
that, although most of the techniques the article 
examines are not yet feasible, we ought to 
consider them for three reasons. First, if they 
discredit luck egalitarianism, one of the most 
prominent theories in contemporary political 
philosophy, they may present a reason to 
abandon the theory, even if we only reach a 
limited number of these technological advances. 
Second, there is a wide belief that at least some 
of these technologies will be available in the near 
future and if so, it will be useful to be prepared 
                                                          
ii
 In order to neutralise the effects of brute luck on the 
distribution of resources, Dworkin proposes a scheme that 
is sensitive to individuals’ ambitions (via a hypothetical 
auction) and insensitive to their endowments (via a 
hypothetical insurance market). See Dworkin, R. 
Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. 
Harvard University Press, 2000. 
iii
 These conceptual distinctions are especially serious for 
the case of subsequent generations; namely, what luck 
egalitarianism implies for interventions on persons that 
will come to existence. 
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on how we will assess them both morally and 
legally
2
. Lastly, a theoretical pursuit of this kind 
has value on its own, as it enables us to refine 
and clarify our moral convictions. 
 
 
Part I: Criticisms of Luck Egalitarianism in 
the Genetic Era 
 
The Basic Argument 
 The main argument against luck 
egalitarianism in the face of genetic engineering, 
which also forms the basis of further charges, 
views those theories of justice as requiring 
absolute genetic equality. The ‘brute luck view 
of the level playing field conception of equality 
of opportunity’, as Buchanan et al name it, has 
undesirable consequences for genetic 
engineering in virtue of its commitment to the 
equalisation of opportunities that spring from 
circumstances individuals cannot control
3
. To 
see how this may follow, let us examine the 
basic commitments of luck egalitarianism: the 
theory requires that the distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation be 
sensitive to option luck and insensitive to brute 
luck. The latter requirement gives rise to a 
societal obligation to redress inequalities that 
arise due to brute luck. Thus, in order to see what 
a principle of redress requires, we ought to turn 
brute luck into option luck, as Dworkin’s 
hypothetical insurance scheme does
4
. 
 The argument advanced by Buchanan et al 
may be reconstructed as follows. Genetic 
inequalities arise due to brute luck; genetic 
engineering turns brute luck in the natural lottery 
into option luck; therefore, luck egalitarianism 
requires endorsing all forms of genetic 
engineering, as they turn brute luck into option 
luck. Now this last claim may initially seem 
unproblematic, if not a point of strength for luck 
egalitarianism, which highlights the arbitrariness 
of natural inequalities. Yet, as the additional 
criticisms that will be examined shall reveal, the 
concept of genetic equality presents numerous 
problems. 
 Now, a further complication of this 
argument is that it identifies such genetic 
interventions as obligatory. To the extent that 
brute luck can literally be turned into option 
luck, as happens in a one-generation case, a 
caveat may be formulated in order to protect 
individuals’ liberty; interventions should not be 
obligatory if individuals are in a position to 
choose their genetic makeup themselves. Yet in 
the case of subsequent generations, brute luck 
can be turned into option luck in a way that does 
render interventions obligatory by this line of 
argument. If the state imposes genetic equality, 
there will be no inequalities arising from natural 
endowments. Natural brute luck will then be 
eliminated, leaving the space it normally 
occupies to individuals’ option luck. If this can 
actually be achieved with minimal risk, as has 
been stipulated, luck egalitarianism requires all 
interventions that will induce genetic equality. 
 Luck egalitarians’ critics build on this 
basis to identify further reasons for which the 
conclusions reached by the basic argument are 
morally repugnant. Nevertheless, by developing 
a theory of just genetic interventions that follows 
from Dworkinian luck egalitarianism, it will 
become clear that the criticisms examined in Part 
I are based on a misunderstanding of the 
necessary central commitments of luck 
egalitarianism. Although certain formulations of 
the theory may be vulnerable to these objections, 
I will argue that deriving luck egalitarian 
commitments from Dworkin’s ethical 
individualism is one plausible way of 
safeguarding luck egalitarianism. 
 
Luck Egalitarianism and Libertarianism 
 On the assumption that luck egalitarianism 
requires genetic equality as expounded in the 
previous section, it has been argued that, due to 
its commitment to ambition-sensitivity, the 
theory collapses into libertarianism
5
. The claim 
is that since individuals ought to face the 
consequences of their option luck, and since 
genetic engineering turns brute luck into option 
luck, individuals ought to accept the inequalities 
that arise due to their natural endowments. Even 
if some refrain from using genetic technologies, 
their genetic inequalities will not have to be 
redressed, for they will reflect their 
unwillingness to change, that is, a choice they 
have responsibly made
6
. This conclusion will 
serve to strengthen desert-based theories, as it 
will dismantle the objection that arbitrary natural 
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inequalities cannot establish desert in unequal 
advantages. If individuals’ choices reflect their 
ambitions, others should not be required to 
compensate them for any consequences that 
follow from those choices. Thus, what this 
argument aims to discredit, is not luck 
egalitarians’ conceptual commitments, but the 
conclusions they typically deduce from them. 
Equality of resources or equality of access to 
welfare or advantage cannot be legitimate 
requirements of justice if agents simply deserve 
the full consequences of their choices. 
 Nevertheless, this argument oversimplifies 
the implications of the distinction between brute 
luck and option luck. First, considering that 
many interventions would be performed on 
embryos, brute luck in genetics would not be 
eliminated. As Dworkin points out, ‘the fact that 
someone’s genes have been designed by others, 
rather than chance or nature, and are in that way 
‘social’, does not convert his genetic structure 
into option luck for him’7. Second, one’s 
endowments are not limited to one’s genetic 
makeup, but further include the effects of brute 
luck in the social lottery. For example, Dworkin 
stresses that ‘the low-wage insurance 
presupposes, among the causes of unemployment 
and low wages, a host of social factors’8. 
Therefore, in an era of genetic equality luck 
egalitarians would still have reason to support a 
strong welfare state.  
 
A Homogeneous World 
 A different criticism of luck egalitarianism, 
which further seems to underlie numerous 
worries about genetic engineering, takes the 
following form. Certain traits are valued more 
than others, giving rise to an unequal distribution 
of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. 
Since luck egalitarianism requires the pursuit of 
genetic equality, it implicitly requires the 
elimination of some traits and talents that are 
valued less. Thus, it has been claimed that luck 
egalitarianism in the face of genetic engineering 
would be, at least on a philosophical level, 
committed to constructing a homogenised world 
of nearly identical people
iv,9
. 
                                                          
iv
 Buchanan et al grant that luck egalitarianism would not 
in fact prescribe complete genetic equality, due to 
complications relating to social policy. Yet they believe 
 The worry is that ‘engineering might be 
used to perpetuate the occurrence of now desired 
traits of height, intelligence, colour and 
personality’, thereby ‘robbing the world of the 
variety that seems essential to novelty, 
originality and fascination’10. Moreover, given 
that the value we attach to traits is socially 
constructed, Farrelly argues that the endorsement 
of genetic equality is especially problematic, for 
it implies the perpetuation of temporally 
constrained values. Luck egalitarian 
prescriptions will thus prove to be self-defeating, 
as the traits of genetically modified individuals 
may come to be valueless under different 
circumstances
11
. Indeed, individuals that 
currently thrive in Western, liberal societies 
would lack the traits and talents that would be 
necessary to live well in agrarian societies. 
 However, the homogeneity objection rests 
on the dubious scientific assumption that 
phenotypes, such as the manifestation of talent, 
are wholly traceable back to a specific genotype, 
ignoring once again the significance of the social 
lottery
12
. More importantly, this objection makes 
the unjustified and implausible assumption that 
luck egalitarians must simply accept the values 
that the majority attaches to certain traits and 
talents, just like it does with resources. 
Dworkin’s theory asks people to make their 
choices regarding resources by keeping in mind 
the value that others attach to those resources. 
The worry that underlies the homogeneity 
argument may be, for example, that because 
people value and reward blondes by giving them 
access to advantages, luck egalitarianism 
requires that we all have blond hair. However, 
sensitivity to others’ evaluations is encouraged in 
the distribution of resources due to scarcity and 
opportunity costs. From this we cannot deduce 
anything for the values involved in the 
distribution of traits and talents. It cannot follow, 
therefore, that luck egalitarians must simply 
accept current evaluations of traits and distribute 
those with the highest scores equally. As we will 
see in Part II, they can develop detailed 
prescriptions that can guide public policy on 
genetic engineering, without adopting 
                                                                                               
that this result is inconsistent with its philosophical 
commitments. 
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implausible assumptions about different traits’ 
value. 
 
Perfectionist Concerns 
 A final obstacle that the pursuit of genetic 
equality poses to luck egalitarianism is that of 
perfectionist implications. The worry here is not 
that theorists will strive to create Nietzschean 
Übermenschen, since their motivation is by 
definition egalitarian in nature; rather, it is feared 
that, in practice, genetic equality is doomed to 
end up resembling Nietzschean perfectionism. 
 First, it may seem that in order to eliminate 
genetic inequalities, luck egalitarianism will seek 
to ‘rid the world of undesirables’ by endorsing 
perfectionist judgements on which lives are 
better lived, and on which people are inherently 
better than others. In this sense, echoing 
Elizabeth Anderson’s complaint, luck 
egalitarians’ commitment to the fundamental 
basic equality of all would be shaken
13
. In fact, it 
may be claimed, not only would states be 
required to announce who is better, but they 
would also seek, in the name of justice, to make 
those who are different just like those better 
ones. However, as I will show in Part II, luck 
egalitarianism need not express a commitment to 
perfectionist judgements about value; in fact, the 
implications of such judgements in the face of 
genetic engineering provide a further reason for 
endorsing a liberal egalitarian theory of justice. 
 Second, it may be claimed that genetic 
equality will come to resemble Nietzschean 
perfectionism because the enhancements it 
demands are boundless
14
. Let us assume that few 
people have an IQ of 160; as we raise everyone’s 
IQ to match that level, presumably some 
persons’ IQ will rise further, at least in the long-
run, from interacting only with highly intelligent 
people. Predicting this simple fact will trigger a 
hunt for perfection. Nevertheless, even if we 
assume that this is indeed what luck 
egalitarianism requires, it does not seem 
obviously true that the consequence of a human 
species with a high average IQ level is 
intrinsically bad. Besides, it seems that evolution 
has been working with the same driving forces, 
albeit in a slower and natural way
15
. Moreover, 
there is a morally pertinent difference between 
seeking to eliminate inequalities caused by brute 
luck, and seeking to achieve the best that can be 
achieved at any time. The first motivation can in 
fact draw certain boundaries to what ought to be 
pursued, even if time shifts those boundaries, as 
happens with Darwinian evolution anyway, 
while the latter is indeed boundless. 
 Third, it has been claimed that ‘use of 
enhancements may reinforce superficiality, 
narcissism, selfishness, deceitfulness, laziness, 
and lack of integrity’16. However, assuming an 
anti-perfectionist political morality is adopted, if 
equality requires certain interventions, we may 
not plausibly claim that we will sacrifice the 
requirements of justice because they might have 
poor consequences for the character of some 
people. If a potential undesirable effect of 
technology or medicine on some individuals’ 
character suffices to ban its use altogether, then 
we ought to ban plastic surgeries and the use of 
social media as well. Even if a perfectionist line 
of reasoning is adopted, since such options do 
not have the same effects on everyone, it seems 
that certain background psychological and 
sociological factors should be targeted. For 
example, the availability of a mobile phone that 
can take a selfie cannot create narcissism; if we 
endorse perfectionism and if perfectionist public 
policy ought to lower such traits, then the 
pertinent factors have to be addressed. In any 
case, the argument does not suffice to ban the 
availability of enhancements. 
 
 
Part II: Luck Egalitarian Implications 
 
 The criticisms examined display a 
common fallacy; they assume that, in virtue of 
luck egalitarians’ commitment to the 
neutralization of the effects of brute luck, they 
must endorse any neutralization of that luck 
itself. First, this claim may seem to follow from 
the view that the neutralization of the effects of 
luck is defended simply as a second-best solution 
to the problem that brute luck poses to equality 
and responsibility. For example, Buchanan, 
Brock, Daniels, and Wikler argue that certain 
luck egalitarians have endorsed the ‘Resource 
Compensation Principle’ only because it has not 
been possible to intervene in the natural lottery
17
. 
Second, it may be argued that even if the primary 
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goal is to equalize solely the effects of brute 
luck, the most effective way of achieving it will 
implicate genetic interventions
18
. Since we 
cannot, for example, completely neutralize the 
inequalities that arise from individuals’ different 
talents, the second-best solution may in fact be to 
equalize their talents in the first place. Either 
way, the conclusion reached is that luck 
egalitarians must advocate genetic equality. 
 I contend, however, that both claims can 
only be upheld by focusing on one part of luck 
egalitarianism, namely, the arbitrariness of brute 
luck in determining individuals’ life chance, and 
by thereby ignoring the source of the theory’s 
commitments; the principles dictated by 
Dworkin’s ethical individualism. An analysis of 
these principles within the context of genetic 
engineering produces policy-guiding 
prescriptions that identify which interventions 
are permissible or required from the viewpoint of 
Dworkinian luck egalitarianism.  
  
Ethical Individualism 
 At the heart of Dworkin’s theory one finds 
a set of views on morality, signifying how we 
ought to treat each other; ethical individualism 
comprises two principles, which give rise to a 
commitment to equal concern for all citizens, 
and to liberal neutrality. First, it is maintained 
that ‘it is objectively and equally important that 
any human life, once begun, succeed rather than 
fail’19. It follows from this principle that political 
morality must be egalitarian, as states must 
demonstrate a commitment to providing the 
structures required for the pursuit of successful 
lives by all. Second, there is a special 
responsibility on the part of each agent to ensure 
that her life be successful. That special 
responsibility is expressed in the ‘right to make 
the fundamental decisions that define, for her, 
what a successful life would be’, which gives 
rise to the requirement of political autonomy
20
. 
Therefore, political morality must also be liberal, 
stressing the significance of the liberty to define 
and pursue one’s conception of the good. 
 In fact, that significance is a distinctive 
parameter of successful lives; in order for a life 
to be successful, it is necessary that the 
individual living it identify with the conception 
of the good pursued. Ethical integrity can only 
be achieved if one ‘lives out of the conviction 
that no other life he might live would be a 
plainly better response to the parameters of his 
ethical situation rightly judged’21. 
 We thus arrive to the following 
considerations, which ought to be taken into 
account when public policy is designed and 
evaluated. First, states ought to advance their 
citizens’ well-being, as dictated by the first 
principle of ethical individualism
22
. Second, a 
crucial parameter of that well-being is justice, 
which defines what it means for a state to 
manifest equal concern for the lives of all; 
Dworkinian luck egalitarianism dictates that 
inequalities traceable to brute luck ought to be 
neutralised. In the absence of justice, citizens 
face the wrong kinds of challenges, such as 
satisfying their basic needs. Third, the good life 
depends further on the extent to which one has 
achieved ethical integrity, as defined by the 
special responsibility principle of ethical 
individualism. What follows from this parameter 
is a liberal commitment to anti-perfectionism, 
which automatically places certain constraints on 
the policies a state may pursue
v
. For example, a 
government may not induce or coerce 
individuals into becoming doctors instead of 
musicians, on the basis of a belief that the life of 
a doctor is more successful or worthy than that 
of an unrecognized musician; if it did, it would 
violate the requirement of equal concern for 
individuals’ ethical integrity. It seems, thus, that 
the three considerations produce a liberal 
egalitarian political morality, with concrete 
guidelines for the shape of policy-makers’ 
objectives: given that individuals hold different 
comprehensive doctrines, equal respect for all 
requires that individuals be free to pursue their 
conception of the good. 
 
                                                          
v
 Whether or not Dworkin’s theory should be classified as 
anti-perfectionist is a highly controversial matter. It seems, 
however, that even if there is a perfectionist element in the 
philosophical basis of his arguments, he rejects this 
characterization of his views on public policy. 
See Dworkin, R. ‘Ronald Dworkin Replies’. In: Burley J 
(ed) Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin. 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004:357. 
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Resolving an Inconsistency 
 When this political morality is reviewed in 
the face of genetic engineering, an inconsistency 
seems to be exposed: despite endorsing political 
neutrality, Dworkinian luck egalitarianism 
requires the state taking a stance on which lives 
require redress, and therefore an assessment of 
the value of different consequences of luck; 
simultaneously, it also requires evaluating the 
significance of choice. 
 Luck egalitarianism seems to advocate 
conclusions that would violate neutrality. For 
example, if it is public knowledge that scientific 
skills are valued more than musical talent, and 
the former can only be enhanced in an individual 
if the latter is reduced (not a far-fetched scenario 
given that genetic aptitude in those different 
areas depends on different sides of the brain), it 
may be argued that luck egalitarianism requires 
that the enhancement be performed on at least 
some disadvantaged members of society. Yet 
this would be a clear violation of neutrality, as it 
would involve a public demonstration of the 
superiority of certain talents and modes of life 
over others. 
 One way to avoid this inconsistency is to 
refrain from giving luck any metaphysical 
significance in the account of justice; we may 
say that the unequal effects of brute luck are 
unjust, without implying that the traits it 
produces are objectively bad. Clearly, there 
would be no interpersonal disadvantage
vi
 from 
‘low’ intelligence in a society where that level 
would be the norm. 
 What follows from this view is that, when 
genetic circumstances have neutral value and 
cannot be evaluated, justice only concerns the 
inequalities that arise from brute luck. For 
example, if being from a certain race causes 
disadvantages to that person, then the rationale 
implicitly adopted by the critiques of luck 
egalitarianism examined in Part I would view 
luck egalitarianism as prescribing the elimination 
of disadvantaged races. Viewing a multifaceted 
                                                          
vi
 The interpersonal conception of disadvantage should not 
be confused with the counterfactual conception, according 
to which one’s position is to be compared with one’s 
position if things had worked out differently; in this case, 
that would be a society with a different average level of 
intelligence. 
theory in this light is clearly implausible, as in 
situations of discrimination luck egalitarianism 
requires the alleviation of structural injustices, a 
requirement that springs from its commitment to 
equal concern for all. 
 Similarly, we may place constraints on the 
interventions that ought to be pursued when 
genetic traits are considered valuable by only 
some people, given their religious, moral, and 
aesthetic views. The implications of luck 
egalitarianism for this kind of genetic 
engineering are clear once we draw on the 
parameter of ethical integrity and the 
corresponding principle of special responsibility. 
It follows that a state would never impose or 
actively encourage interventions that express 
controversial comprehensive doctrines. For 
example, Dworkin could not, consistently with 
his commitments, advocate enhancements that 
appeal to particular, controversial views on 
beauty or desirable characteristics. The fear that 
luck egalitarianism would ‘give way to a 
biotechnologically preserved tyranny of the 
normality’, by requiring that women have 
‘blonde hair, blue eyes, small waist, big chest, 
and a tall figure’ is therefore misplaced23. 
Similarly, to return to an example I previously 
touched upon, suppose the skills of civil 
engineers are valued more than those of 
musicians, irrespective of their contribution to 
society
vii
. Let us suppose further that certain 
individuals are socially disadvantaged because 
they possess the latter and not the former skills. 
If scientific skills can only be enhanced at the 
cost of musical skills, our commitment to ethical 
individualism would restrain the state from 
actively pursuing this form of genetic 
engineering
24
. 
 Now, even though we have established that 
such interventions could never be required by 
luck egalitarian commitments, a separate 
question concerns whether they should be 
allowed. Non-ideal considerations, such as the 
level of existing inequalities in the resources 
people hold, the cost, and the price of 
interventions, are pertinent on this matter. We 
may reach, however, certain provisional 
                                                          
vii
 It is assumed that there is no collective need for civil 
engineers. 
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conclusions in the context of ideal theory, 
although these may be outweighed by realistic 
considerations. 
 If the question concerns competent adults 
making such decisions for themselves, there is a 
pro tanto reason in favour of permitting these 
interventions, in virtue of the special 
responsibility principle. In the context of ideal 
theory, two objections may be raised to this 
claim. First, it might be argued that since the 
state ought to be concerned with individuals’ 
well-being, as has been established, it should 
protect individuals from performing irrevocable 
actions, especially when they carry an element of 
risk for harm. Nevertheless, we generally accept 
and should keep accepting that ‘people can 
voluntarily consent to sterilizations, sex change 
operations, abortions, and plastic surgery’25. 
Second, there is a worry that comprehensive 
doctrines do not reflect one’s genuine 
commitments, as they adapt to match the 
dominant value that is preferred in society. 
However, if such preferences were to revoke 
individuals’ decision-making powers, most of 
our decisions and transactions would be deemed 
problematic. Indeed, our preferences also adapt 
to the values our parents or friends may have, 
and change according to our experiences. That, 
however, is not sufficient to demand constraints 
on self-sovereignty; luck is all-pervading in our 
lives, yet we ought to be able to bear 
responsibility for our choices. That 
responsibility, reflected in the second principle 
of ethical individualism, establishes a pro tanto 
reason for allowing individuals to pursue their 
conception of the good even by means of genetic 
engineering. As I will argue shortly, however, 
there are limits on this responsibility when the 
decision to pursue one’s life plans directly 
implicates third parties, such as their children. 
 It is by now clear that the morality at the 
heart of Dworkin’s theory, ethical individualism, 
produces significant guidelines and conclusions 
for the debate on genetic engineering. As we 
have seen, ethical individualism serves to point 
out which instances of bad luck ought to be 
altered genetically and which ought to be altered 
socially; when the evaluation of the effects of 
brute luck varies radically among different 
reasonable conceptions of the good, Dworkinian 
luck egalitarianism refrains from endorsing 
genetic interventions. Thus, luck egalitarianism 
is safeguarded from frequent objections, which 
misrepresent its claims. 
 
Procreators versus Offspring 
 Although ethical individualism produces 
clear implications for the permissibility of 
interventions in a one-generation case, in which 
each person decides for herself, several questions 
arise when reflecting upon subsequent 
generations. First, does Dworkinian luck 
egalitarianism require at least certain 
interventions, even against the wishes of 
procreators? Second, to what extent ought the 
interests of procreators, including the 
comprehensive doctrines they hold, determine 
the lives of their offspring? In other words, 
which genetic interventions on embryos, fetuses, 
and infants are permissible? 
 
Obligatory Interventions 
 The first question poses the issue of 
obligatory interventions, which parents would 
not be permitted to deny on behalf of their 
offspring. Now, contrarily to objectively value-
neutral interventions, which may of course 
obtain subjective value according to individuals’ 
comprehensive doctrines, there are certain 
interventions to which luck egalitarianism is 
indeed whole-heartedly committed. These are 
cases in which there is overlapping consensus 
across reasonable people, cultures and times on 
the claim that they are objectively bad or on the 
less strong claim that they ought to be 
eliminated. The significance of this consensus is 
not based on citizens’ actual agreement; it rather 
derives from the fact that it is necessary in order 
to express equal concern for the special 
responsibility of each to lead a successful life. 
The idea of overlapping consensus rests on the 
reasons individuals have to accept the imposition 
of certain policies and their consequences on 
their lives. The imposition of controversial 
interventions would insult the political equality 
of all citizens and inhibit their corresponding 
autonomy to pursue their conception of the good. 
Thus, Dworkinian luck egalitarianism only 
demands interventions whose aims all reasonable 
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individuals have reason to endorse, regardless of 
their comprehensive doctrines
viii
. 
 Examples of such cases include premature 
death and extreme suffering, as happens, for 
example, to individuals who have ALS or Tay-
Sachs. In those instances, all individuals would 
presumably agree that it is desirable to not suffer 
from these conditions. The fact that certain 
procreators may desire to refuse those 
interventions does not override their urgency, 
which springs from the fact that they are either 
prerequisites for any reasonable life plan, or they 
would strongly benefit all reasonable life plans. 
Indeed, in order to discharge the special 
responsibility that one bears for her life, it is 
necessary to possess certain minimum physical 
and mental capabilities. As parents may not keep 
their children’s nutrition to unacceptable levels, 
in the age of genetic engineering they may not 
inflict harm on them. It should be clear that these 
interventions are not limited to treatments; just 
as it is important that certain threats to all life 
plans be eliminated, it is also significant that 
enhancements that advance most life plans be 
endorsed. For example, an enhanced immune or 
memory system and life extension would 
presumably also meet the consensus criterion. 
 One way in which we might render the 
argument action-guiding is by appealing to the 
idea of hypothetical consent; interventions are 
required if we have good reason to assume that 
an unconscious person would consent to them. 
We may follow John Harris’ suggestion that we 
should imagine an unconscious person in the ER, 
‘whose condition can be reversed or removed’26. 
If in this scenario we could charge the doctors 
for being negligent, we have good reason to 
assume that the intervention is morally 
required
27
. For example, permanent paralysis 
would clearly pass the test, while a rhinoplasty 
would not. Similarly, if doctors could, with no 
extra risk, increase the patient’s life expectancy 
beyond average, we would not imagine the 
patient complaining that she would like to have 
her shorter life expectancy back. 
                                                          
viii
 Following John Rawls’ definition, comprehensiveness 
refers to ‘conceptions of what is of value in life’, as well as 
to ‘ideals of personal character’ and of relationships. 
Rawls J. Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition. Columbia 
University Press, 2005:13. 
 When techniques involving gene selection 
are necessary, the non-identity problem arises. 
We may not say that a life with ALS, for 
example, is worse than non-existence. The above 
argument cannot, therefore, be formulated in a 
person-affecting manner; instead, we may say 
that there are impersonal duties to act in certain 
ways, with certain motivations, even if the 
consequences of those actions are not good or 
bad for specific people
28
. 
 Now the question arises, if there is 
overlapping consensus on the fact that the aims 
of certain interventions are universally desirable, 
why would certain parents ever deny them to 
their children? Why does the issue of obligatory 
interventions arise? One example highlights the 
necessary means that interventions involve. For 
example, if blood transfusion is required for a 
procedure, Jehovah’s witnesses will deny it; yet 
this does not imply that they do not view a 
prolonged life, or a life with no suffering, as 
something good and desirable. Similarly, it is not 
utterly unimaginable that certain individuals 
would oppose the human desire to ‘play God’, 
irrespective of the benefits it may bring. The 
reasons that certain procreators have to refuse 
these goods to their offspring do not override the 
reasons that their offspring would have for 
complaint. Given that procreators are already 
free to pursue their conception of the good, 
giving priority to their desires by curbing their 
offspring’s future autonomy to do the same 
would clearly violate the requirement of equal 
concern. 
 A crucial implication of this suggestion is 
that liberal respect for bodily integrity ‘may have 
to be qualified’; this is because ‘the principle of 
special responsibility would no longer justify 
allowing a pregnant woman to refuse tests to 
discover such a defect in an embryo she carries, 
and the first principle of ethical humanism – an 
objective concern that any life be successful – 
would counsel mandatory testing’29. It may be 
objected that by this rationale, luck 
egalitarianism would also require abortions. 
However, advocates of abortion can clearly not 
appeal to the interests of the person that will 
exist. The disagreement springs from 
disagreement over when life and personhood 
begin. Given that these matters are so 
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intertwined with one’s freedom to pursue their 
conception of the good the state cannot take an 
absolute stance on them without violating the 
requirement of overlapping consensus. If it did, 
it would force individuals to either act in ways 
that they would equate to murder or to feel that 
women are treated as second-class citizens. In 
any case, the issue of abortion cannot be fully 
addressed on this occasion, as it presents 
significant differences to any other form of 
genetic engineering. 
 
Permissible Interventions 
 A separate issue for Dworkinian luck 
egalitarianism asks which interventions, and 
under what circumstances, parents may 
permissibly choose for their offspring. The case 
for the permissibility of interventions rests on the 
value of reproductive freedom, which further 
rests on both principles of ethical individualism. 
The state ought to express equal concern for the 
special responsibility each has to lead a 
successful life, according to their conception of 
the good; a significant part of that conception is 
found in one’s convictions and desires regarding 
reproduction and upbringing. Having the 
freedom to raise one’s children according to 
one’s convictions, by exposing them to specific 
moral, aesthetic, religious and other 
comprehensive doctrines, is usually viewed as 
central in leading the life one considers to be a 
success
30. It follows that respect for individuals’ 
procreative freedom and rights implies the 
permissibility of raising one’s offspring in 
accordance with reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. 
 On the other hand, certain limits are placed 
to procreative freedom in order to protect 
children’s interests and rights. When parental 
decisions are harmful to their offspring, the state 
may intervene. For example, parents may not 
abuse their children, even if they really believe 
that they would teach them ‘valuable’ lessons. 
Similarly, they may not harm their children by 
reducing their opportunities to ‘form, revise, and 
rationally pursue their own conception of the 
good life’, as the principle of special 
responsibility requires
31
. For example, most 
countries rightly have a system of compulsory 
education, which guarantees that children of all 
backgrounds will have an adequate range of 
opportunities once they reach an age in which 
they can follow their own life plan. 
 A preliminary conclusion that we can 
reach by combining these two, frequently 
opposing, requirements of ethical individualism 
indicates a pro tanto reason to respect 
individuals’ decisions in reproduction and 
upbringing, with the exception of cases in which 
the interests of their offspring are compromised. 
 Nevertheless, this prima facie 
permissibility of interventions that do not 
compromise the opportunities of the child opens 
up the way to allowing ‘designer children’, by 
also choosing, say, its sex. In fact, parents may 
opt for a Caucasian male, as this choice would 
expand the child’s range of opportunities in our 
non-ideal world. Thus, further limits must be 
placed on the area of parental choice. 
 This problematic claim reveals the 
necessity for a different account of autonomy. 
For if one endorses a perfectionist account of 
autonomy, whereby it is viewed as an end-state 
that ought to be pursued by any means, then 
parents will in fact have a moral obligation to 
their children to expand their opportunities by 
endowing them with all socially desirable 
characteristics. 
 However, the principle of special 
responsibility seems to require a precondition 
account of autonomy: on this view, autonomy is 
an on-going process that ‘requires one’s choices 
not to be coerced or manipulated by others’32. A 
person’s autonomy is violated, in this sense, ‘if 
the genes which constitute her and shape her 
motivations and abilities are manipulated or 
chosen on the basis of her parents conception of 
the good’33. Importantly, this account of 
autonomy explains why it seems intuitively 
wrong to choose a child’s characteristics, even 
though if they do not, brute luck will do so 
anyway. It makes a relevant difference that if the 
child regrets its traits it will regret a person’s 
choice, rather than an impersonal fact about 
nature. It should be emphasized here that this 
point concerns only interventions which can 
hinder the pursuit of certain conceptions of the 
good. Increased intelligence and an enhanced 
immune system, for example, would not reduce 
one’s autonomy in any way, assuming that 
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achieving them would not have opportunity costs 
in terms of abilities and traits, for such traits are 
consistent with all reasonable conceptions of the 
good. 
 Now it may be argued that if Dworkinian 
luck egalitarians are committed to this account of 
autonomy, they cannot allow parents to instill in 
their offspring specific religious or other 
comprehensive views. However, without taking 
a stance on such practices of upbringing, it 
should be stressed that there is, however, a 
crucial difference between conventional 
perfectionist parenting methods and 
controversial genetic interventions; the former 
are offset by a compulsory public provision of 
education, freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, etc., whereas the latter are inextricably tied 
to the individual’s personal identity.  
 Therefore, it has become clear that genetic 
interventions are impermissible insofar as they 
harm the offspring, or violate its autonomy, 
when the precondition account is adopted. I have 
only provided a plausible and non-exhaustive 
argument available for the luck egalitarian; there 
may be other ways to safeguard luck 
egalitarianism, even if a different conception of 
autonomy is adopted; to the extent that this is not 
possible, luck egalitarians have reason to reject 
the conceptions of autonomy that give rise to the 
charge examined. 
 While it is not possible to provide a 
complete examination of all the interventions 
that Dworkinian luck egalitarianism would view 
as permissible, this discussion offers certain 
preliminary guidelines that could provide the 
basis for further research. 
 
Hypothetical Insurance 
 I suggest that the same conclusions that 
have been reached by an analysis of the abstract 
morality at the heart of Dworkin’s luck 
egalitarianism, ethical individualism, can also be 
reached by examining his hypothetical insurance 
scheme. In fact, this thought experiment also 
produces certain rough guidelines for problems 
faced in non-ideal theory. First, it indicates what 
ought to happen in cases of partial compliance. 
For example, should a child whose parents have 
either ignored the moral and legal requirements 
regarding interventions, or made a bad genetic 
choice, bear the consequences of that choice? 
Second, I will argue that hypothetical insurance 
produces a plausible rationale for the 
management of scarce resources. 
 Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scenario 
asks us to imagine ‘what level of insurance 
against low income and bad luck’ individuals 
would buy, if they all possessed equal resources, 
if they had no knowledge on the risk for specific 
forms of bad luck they faced themselves, and if 
they only possessed information on the average 
risk of these forms of bad luck, and on ‘the 
availability, cost, and value of remedies for the 
consequences of bad luck’34. Let us assume, as 
Dworkin does, that these individuals know the 
comprehensive doctrines that they hold. In order 
to address the intergenerational problem 
discussed in the Procreators versus Offspring 
section, we may further suppose that there are 
also representatives from those generations, who, 
unaware of their own particular comprehensive 
doctrines, aim to ensure their autonomy (the 
preconditions of which include a fair 
intergenerational distribution of resources). 
 The results would presumably match the 
ones derived above. Individuals would first 
insure against the most serious instances of bad 
luck, namely those that would seriously hinder 
any life plan, such as premature death and 
intense suffering. Subsequently, they would 
insure against what will come to be perceived as 
bad luck given the availability of genetic 
technologies; since prolonged lives would be 
desired by all, if they were available individuals 
would ensure that they get the necessary 
enhancements. In fact, given that all would select 
those enhancements, prolonged lives would 
expectedly become the norm, thereby making 
insurance against their absence intelligible
35
. As 
these two choices would rationally be made by 
the representatives of subsequent generations as 
well, they would have to be obligatory when 
children’s interests came into question. 
Similarly, individuals would preserve a space of 
permissible interventions, constrained by the 
requirements of subsequent generations’ 
autonomy. 
 Moreover, the representatives of 
subsequent generations would presumably insure 
against certain kinds of their procreators’ bad 
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option luck. If they know that certain procreators 
will fail to provide them with the necessary 
interventions, and that certain procedures will be 
unsuccessful, they will expectedly insure against 
both instances of bad luck. Similarly, those in the 
current generation will generally insure against 
the outcomes of unsuccessful interventions as 
well. 
 Lastly, hypothetical insurance offers 
guidance on the non-ideal consideration of 
resource allocation in the face of scarcity. 
Presumably, individuals presented with the 
relevant facts, and in the absence of information 
that would generate bias, would reach certain 
conclusions on where to allocate what amount of 
resources. Given budget constraints and costs, 
they would decide which interventions would be 
a priority in public policy, and which would only 
be pursued in the case of a budget surplus. These 
thought-experiments are not useless in a non-
ideal context; we may safely suppose, for 
example, that life-prolongation and immunity to 
cancer would feature highly in that list. From 
this we can further infer that as long as these 
interventions are not available, certain kinds of 
research should be prioritized. Colin Farrelly 
claims that non-ideal considerations are fatal for 
luck egalitarianism, as it fails to ‘balance the 
desire for achieving genetic equality with the 
desire for achieving other kinds of equality and 
other values’36. Yet the hypothetical insurance 
scheme does just that; individuals’ decisions will 
express considered judgments on the trade-offs 
their budget allows them to make. Two points 
that will influence those decisions should be 
stressed. First, the risks that procedures carry are 
subject to change as science evolves. Second, 
interventions may be seen as a cost-effective 
way of reducing the necessity of other forms of 
public policy in the long-run; for example, if 
humans become healthier, with better immune 
systems, it is likely that less will have to be spent 
on health care. Therefore, the hypothetical 
insurance thought-experiment serves a twofold 
purpose; it confirms that the conclusions reached 
by an analysis of a Dworkinian political morality 
are sound, and it safeguards luck egalitarianism 
from the objection that it makes unrealistic 
demands in our non-ideal world. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 It has thus been argued that luck 
egalitarianism can, not only survive the prospect 
of genetic engineering, but also provide us with 
valuable guidance on how to respond to new 
genetic technologies. By analyzing the criticisms 
of luck egalitarianism in the face of genetic 
interventions, I have exposed the basic 
underlying argument; these criticisms rely on the 
claim that luck egalitarian commitments produce 
a philosophical adherence to genetic equality. On 
these grounds, luck egalitarianism is discredited, 
for genetic equality is thought to reduce luck 
egalitarianism into libertarianism, and to give 
rise to homogeneity and perfectionist concerns. 
 We have seen, however, that luck 
egalitarianism does not necessarily advocate 
genetic equality. By focusing on the political 
morality at the heart of one plausible variant of 
luck egalitarianism, I have developed an account 
of its philosophical commitments in the era of 
genetic engineering. More specifically, 
Dworkin’s concept of ethical individualism 
serves to identify the interventions that justice 
requires, while preserving the value of political 
autonomy. It seems likely that different luck 
egalitarian theories that give rise to non-
perfectionist public policy prescriptions will 
yield similar conclusions. What the critics have 
revealed is the necessity of safeguarding luck 
egalitarianism from the adoption of controversial 
judgments on the good, which would expose the 
theory to morally reprehensible interventions. 
 Certainly, the prescriptions developed are 
of a pro tanto nature; in order to fully endorse 
their conclusions, we ought to explore a variety 
of non-ideal considerations, including the risk 
and cost of interventions. Moreover, once these 
concerns are addressed, new issues will arise, 
such as the permissibility of the provision of 
obligatory interventions to those who can pay, 
when these cannot be offered to all. It seems that 
Dworkinian luck egalitarianism, along with the 
philosophical tools it offers us, will be in a 
position to offer plausible answers. 
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